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Highlights
  To what extent can “debt-for-climate” swaps, instruments 
that reduce debtor countries’ contractual debt obligations 
in return for local climate-related spending commitments, 
help in tackling worrying debt levels and climate concerns 
simultaneously?
  Debt swaps do not have a great track record, but their 
common flaws could be overcome by scaling up and careful 
design.
  A distinction needs to be made between situations where 
debt is clearly unsustainable – in which case deep and 
comprehensive debt restructuring should be the primary 
focus – and situations where debt is high but sustainable 
– in which case stand-alone debt swaps may be used to 
transfer resources from creditors to debtor countries that are 
committed to climate investments but lack fiscal space.
  Another helpful distinction is that between middle-income 
debtor countries, where debt swaps could finance climate 
mitigation interventions, and low-income debtors, where 
investments in climate adaption deserve prioritization.
  Debt swap proposals need to be mindful of creditor 
incentives, including positive reputational payoffs, and could 
achieve greater scale using a multi-creditor set-up.
Setting the scene
After more than a decade of relative silence, “debt-for-
climate” swaps are again re-surfacing as an instrument 
that promises to kill two birds with one stone: under such 
swaps, creditors allow debtor governments to reduce 
their contractual debt obligations (contributing to debt 
sustainability) in return for a commitment to devote the freed-
up resources to local climate-related spending (contributing 
to climate change mitigation and/or adaptation). Debt-for-
climate swaps are now being advocated by a broadening set 
of stakeholders, including academics, NGOs, think tanks, UN 
financial mechanisms as well as multilateral development 
banks. Recent months have seen a raft of proposals, with 
varying degrees of detail (e.g., Steele & Patel, 2020; Volz et 
al., 2020; Buchheit, 2021; Simmons et al.,2021; Yue & Wang, 
2021). Whilst there is no doubt that both unsustainable debt 
levels in low- and middle-income developing economies and 
climate change are pressing issues, there is a need to carefully 
consider whether and how debt-for-climate swaps can indeed 
be engineered to benefit or, at a minimum, to not harm those 
countries, especially those which are most indebted and 
which face the greatest challenges from climate change.
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The current COVID-19 pandemic has placed an additional 
strain on countries’ financial and human resources and 
has added an extra layer of uncertainty about the future 
(WFP, 2020; IMF, 2021). Governments will emerge from the 
COVID-19 pandemic poorer, with less fiscal revenues to meet 
increased needs, and more indebted, as official development 
aid, export receipts, remittances and other (non-debt-
creating) external inflows are likely to be constrained in the 
short to medium term (OECD, 2020a). While a large number of 
developing (especially low-income) countries were already in 
debt distress or at high risk thereof before the pandemic (IMF, 
2020a), problems have worsened since. This has increased 
the urgency for the international community to act. In May 
2020 the G20 launched the Debt Service Suspension Initiative 
(DSSI), that offers a temporary suspension of bilateral debt 
service to 73 eligible low-income countries, and in November 
2020 it created the Common Framework for Debt Treatments 
beyond the DSSI. The Common Framework brings together 
traditional and “emerging” official bilateral creditors, 
including China and India, to deliver jointly on deeper debt 
restructuring for the same group of low-income countries, 
on a case-by-case basis. It also requires debtors to seek 
comparable debt relief from their private creditors. Clearly, 
while the focus of the Common Framework is on restoring 
debt sustainability, motives to increase debtors’ fiscal space 
are always present too. And while the pandemic may have 
caused priority spending to have temporarily shifted away 
from climate mitigation and adaptation towards health and 
other pandemic-related expenses, there is now increased 
recognition that the post-COVID recovery must first and 
foremost be “green” (OECD, 2020b; IMF, 2020b). Hence, 
there appears to be an opportunity to (re-)prioritize climate-
related spending of the proceeds from debt relief.         
Low- and middle-income countries are particularly affected by 
climate change and are widely recognised to have contributed 
less to greenhouse gas emissions than high-income countries. 
Natural and human systems face serious climate risks without 
immediate adaptation, especially regarding food production, 
water management, cities, and infrastructure (GCA, 2019). 
Low-income countries also have the least ability to adapt, a 
situation which has been exacerbated by COVID-19. But can 
worrying debt levels in these countries and climate concerns 
be tackled simultaneously? And if so, how?
Previous debt swap experiences
Debt swaps, including debt-for-nature, debt-for-education, 
and debt-for-health flavours, do not have a great track record 
(see Cassimon, Verbeke & Renard, 2008; Cassimon, Prowse & 
Essers, 2011, 2014; Cassimon, Essers & Fauzi, 2014 for more 
details and in-depth case studies). First, traditionally, debt 
swaps have been piecemeal operations with a negligible 
effect on overall debt burdens (involving millions rather 
than billions of US dollars), in any case too small to cure 
debtors from any “debt overhang” (Bulow & Rogoff, 1991). 
Second, while debt swaps tend to increase the resources 
that remain in the country (to the extent that debt would 
have been actually repaid in a no-swap scenario), since debt 
service to external creditors is diverted towards domestic 
spending, they do not always create additional fiscal and/
or external space. Often debtor governments need to make 
the same or similar payments as under the original debt 
service (with no or only small discounts), sometimes still in 
scarce hard currency (US dollars or other foreign exchange). 
Third, for most swaps it remains unclear to what extent they 
have generated resources for environmental, education 
or health causes that are truly additional to what debtor 
governments and/or donors had already budgeted for those 
purposes. And fourth, swap operations have often involved 
setting up parallel structures for project implementation and 
monitoring, thereby bypassing the debtor government’s own 
systems and procedures and adding to transaction costs.
Even more recently documented debt swaps fail to show a 
radical break with old practices. The 2015 “debt for marine 
conservation and climate adaptation swap” in the Seychelles 
is a case in point (see Convergence, 2017; Silver & Campbell, 
2018). This swap allowed the Seychelles government to 
buy back about $21.6 million of its debt owed to a set of 
participating official creditors (Belgium, France, Italy, UK) 
for $20.2 million (i.e., at a price of 93.5 cents to the dollar, 
or with a discount of just 6.5%). Financing for the buyback 
was provided by several NGOs (comprising a $15.2 million 
loan from The Nature Conservancy-TNC, and a $5 million grant 
from philanthropic sources) through a newly established 
Seychelles Conservation and Climate Adaptation Trust Fund 
(SeyCCAT). In return, the Seychelles government issued two 
promissory notes amounting to the same $21.6 million, in 
order to pay off the TNC loan as well as to endow SeyCCAT 
to finance its marine conservation and climate adaptation 
activities. Under this swap, the Seychelles government did 
realize some, albeit limited cash flow gains, as the notes had 
a longer maturity and carried a lower interest rate than the 
original debt. The principal amount due was not reduced, and 
the payments to SeyCCAT were still largely in hard currency (in 
US dollars or in its local currency equivalent), so that there 
was little benefit in terms of reduced currency risk. From the 
perspective of climate funding, the swap provided SeyCCAT 
with the means to invest $280,000 per year in local currency 
equivalent for the next 20 years in marine conservation and 
climate adaptation, as well as to capitalize an endowment over 
the same 20 years for future investments, valued at about $6.6 
million. Again, it is unclear to what extent these investments 




investments and/or donor support. Also, it took four years of 
negotiations to complete the deal, with ambitions in terms 
of the number of participating creditors and sums involved 
shrinking over time and with the general credit reputation of 
the Seychelles improving. The latter explains the very small 
discount that was ultimately applied in the buyback.       
Still, all this does not mean that the debt-for-climate swap 
concept should be discarded altogether. Arguably, most 
of debt swaps’ common flaws could be overcome by careful 
design and by scaling up. For example, at the minimum, the 
timing of swap counterpart payments should be aligned with 
the original debt service schedule (which determines the pace 
of debt service savings), so that fiscal space is not further 
reduced. And while strict additionality is hard to prove, 
debtors and official creditors could be asked to explain why 
they believe debt swap proceeds come on top of existing 
budget allocations and creditor interventions in the targeted 
areas (here climate mitigation or adaptation). All else being 
equal, increasing swap size would help realise extra benefits 
from lower debt burdens and improve cost efficiency. In the 
remainder of this note we look at the current potential of debt-
for-climate swaps. We differentiate between situations where 
debt is unsustainable and where it is high but sustainable, and 
between middle- and low-income debtor countries.
Going forward
Deep debt relief
Traditional debt swaps do not appear to be a particularly 
helpful tool to address severe debt problems. In case of 
clearly unsustainable debt, what is needed above all is 
deep, comprehensive debt restructuring, of the kind that 
was delivered in the previous wave of debt distress through 
the Heavily Indebted Poor Country (HIPC) initiative and the 
Multilateral Debt Relief Initiative (MDRI) (Cassimon & Essers, 
2017), and that could now be delivered through the G20’s 
Common Framework. To the extent possible, IMF programmes 
accompanying such deep debt treatments could attempt to 
stimulate a green restart in debtor countries by means of the 
usual policy conditionality, without necessarily requiring 
countries to match one-for-one debt service savings with 
increased climate spending and with respect for countries’ 
existing climate strategies. For example, for a middle-income 
country that wishes to implement mitigation measures, 
renewed budgetary room could be targeted towards public 
investments in renewable energy; this would have the extra 
benefit of reducing oil import bills and thus of saving on 
foreign exchange reserves. A further option could be to link 
deep debt relief with policy commitments that do not require 
new expenditures, such as the phasing out of fuel subsidies or 
the introduction of carbon taxes/regulation. IMF programmes 
associated with comprehensive debt restructuring in low-
income countries should prioritise investments in adaptation 
interventions (as these countries have contributed least 
to emissions and face the greatest threats from climate 
change), including in the water sector, agriculture, and 
climate information systems, alongside public investments 
in renewable energy where possible. Adaptation projects 
at scale often require public goods and common pool 
resource profiles (e.g., public infrastructure networks, water 
management, ecosystem management), which means purely 
privately initiated and funded projects are challenging to 
originate. Forms of public funding can precipitate regulatory 
or coordination functions for collective action. 
Stand-alone debt swaps
Moving away from large-scale, deep debt restructuring 
towards smaller, stand-alone debt swap initiatives, there 
may be ways through which specific groups of low-income 
and middle-income countries could still realise meaningful 
benefits from debt swaps, if carefully engineered. Three 
aspects deserve attention. 
First, debt swaps could be useful in transferring resources 
from official bilateral or private creditors to support climate 
investments in middle-income countries with high but still 
sustainable debts that are committed to climate change 
mitigation but lack fiscal space. Markets for certain mitigation 
investments are mature, such as renewable energy or energy 
efficiency interventions, and the business case is clear. Debt 
swaps could finance mitigation interventions which bring 
considerable co-benefits (such as, again, reducing countries’ 
oil imports). Such interventions could also package up and 
sell carbon offset credits, such as through voluntary markets. 
These swap operations would make sense from a global climate 
mitigation standpoint: middle-income countries are, overall, 
less responsible for emissions than high-income countries (on 
a historical, per capita basis) but currently emit more than 
low-income countries. 
Second, debt swaps could also support climate investments in 
low-income countries with sustainable debts but limited fiscal 
space. As with deep debt treatments, climate investments in 
these contexts should prioritise adaptation. The challenge 
here is for investments to be revenue-generating, whether in 
agriculture, water, climate information or in other sectors. 
Examples of successful revenue-generating interventions 
come from impact investment funds or blended finance 
vehicles. Business models associated with these approaches 
need to be examined in much more detail. 
Third, in both middle-income and low-income country cases, 
we need to consider creditor incentives. If creditors regard 
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nominal sum (because of sovereign risk), debt swaps may be more financially 
attractive to them than providing new conditional cash transfers. For similar 
reasons, environmental NGOs were very active in sponsoring debt-for-nature 
swaps in the late 1980s and early 1990s, when debts owed to commercial 
creditors could be bought at steep discounts in secondary markets. Even 
in the absence of purely financial incentives, debt swaps’ attractiveness 
would be enhanced if they can help fulfil creditors’ climate (Kyoto/Paris) 
commitments (in the case of official bilateral creditors) and/or have positive 
reputational payoffs (also for commercial creditors). For example, a 2005-
2007 debt-for-wind power swap between Spain and Uruguay through the 
now defunct Clean Development Mechanism earned Spain certified emission 
reduction credits (Cassimon, Prowse & Essers, 2014). Particular classes of 
commercial creditors, whose portfolios are increasingly screened against 
environmental criteria, might be persuaded to voluntarily swap their claims 
for new “green bonds” (including a haircut) that earmark bond proceeds to 
climate-related investments. 
Such incentive-compatible features would ideally facilitate the scaling up of 
debt swap operations. Another possible avenue would be to adopt a multi-
donor/creditor approach under G20 initiative, preferably with a common 
monitoring system and supported by the IMF and World Bank. One notable 
example of a multi-creditor debt swap is the Polish EcoFund, whereby the 
United States and five other bilateral creditors joined forces to cancel part 
of their debt claims in exchange for more than $500 million in local currency 
funds for environmental projects between 1992 and 2010 (Zylicz, 2015).
Overall, the COVID-19 pandemic has placed many low- and middle-income 
countries under considerable strain at the same time as the challenges of 
climate change become more pressing. Both deep debt relief and stand-alone 
debt swaps need to differentiate between the types of climate investments 
that are appropriate within middle- and low-income countries. Doing so 
could lead to greater momentum for mitigation as well as help closing the 
adaptation financing gap (UNEP,2021).
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